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FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF
COMPELLING AN INDIVIDUAL TO APPEAR IN A LINEUP
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem discussed herein may be illustrated by the following case in
point:' two men entered a restaurant, shot three people, and then were
observed fleeing in an automobile registered in the name of Alphonso C.
Consequently, Alphonso C. became a suspect in the shooting. Since the police
lacked probable cause to arrest him, 2 the prosecutor applied for and was
granted an order directing Mr. C. to appear in a lineup. In so doing, the court
authorized the detention of Mr. C. for the period necessary to conduct a
lineup.3 However, by issuing a warrant for the seizure of Mr. C. without
probable cause to arrest, the court may have violated the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution, which states that "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause . . . .4
If probable cause to arrest is necessary to compel a suspect to appear in a
lineup, a dilemma is created for law enforcement officials when the evidence
which would constitute such probable cause is a witness' identification.5 A
properly conducted lineup is the most effective way of securing an accurate
identification. 6 In addition, when a suspect is detained in violation of his
1. Alphonso C. v. Morgenthau, 50 App. Div. 2d 97, 376 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st Dep't 1975),
appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.2d 923, 346 N.E.2d 819, 382 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1976) (per curiam).
2. The authorities have probable cause to arrest when they know of facts or circumstances
"sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect) had committed or was
committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see, e.g., Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
3. This order was overturned by the Appellate Division, First Department, on tile grounds
that the issuing judge lacked jurisdiction to so order. 50 App. Div. 2d 97, 376 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st
Dep't 1975). The prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, which
dismissed the appeal and remitted the case to the appellate division to dismiss the appeal taken to
that court. 38 N.Y.2d 923, 346 N.E.2d 819, 382 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1976) (per curiam). See notes
87-89 infra and accompanying text.
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. Cf. Carrington, Speaking for the Police, 61 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 244, 255-58 (1970).
6. See N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification § 3, at 7-8 (1972). Although corporeal identifi-
cation is preferable, photographs are a perfectly valid investigatory tool. See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); Sobel, supra, at 7-8 (1972). A photo lineup should consist of more
than six photographs. 390 U.S. at 386 n.6. However, where there is no photograph available in
police records, obtaining a photograph of the suspect could pose a problem. Photographing the
suspect violates none of his constitutional rights. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967). However, as in the case of lineups, the actual photographing of the suspect must be
distinguished from the infringement of his liberty necessary to accomplish it. See notes 11-13 infra
and accompanying text. Practically, allowing oneself to be photographed should require a lesser
intrusion than appearing in a lineup and could be accomplished without any infringement at all.
However, where any infringement is necessary, fourth amendment issues will arise. See In re
Investigation of a Multi-Vehicle Accident, 135 N.J. Super. 190, 342 A.2d 903 (L. Div. 1975).
LINEUPS
fourth amendment rights, a question arises whether the witness' identification
of the suspect at the lineup or at any subsequent time is admissible into
evidence against him. Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment is not admissible at trial. 7 Courts have
held, however, that when a defendant in a criminal case is compelled to
participate in a lineup in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment,
the witness' subsequent in-court identification of the defendant is admissible if
it is of "independent origin," i.e., not influenced by the witness' prior
identification at the lineup.8 Thus, the remedy available to a defendant whose
constitutional rights have been violated is limited once he is identified at the
lineup.
This Note will first examine the issue of whether compelling an individual
to appear in a lineup violates his fourth amendment rights. The discussion
will attempt to resolve the dilemma encountered by law enforcement au-
thorities who may be unable to secure sufficient evidence against a suspect to
have probable cause to arrest. 9 This Note will then examine some of the
difficulties that a suspect compelled to appear in a lineup will encounter in
securing relief. 10
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL VS. RIGHTS OF SOCIETY
Compelling the suspect to appear in a lineup does not violate his right
against self-incrimination as set forth in the fifth amendment, since it is
generally agreed that the fifth amendment applies only when an individual is
compelled to give evidence of "a testimonial or communicative nature"
against himself."' On the other hand, the constitutionality of requiring an
individual to appear in a lineup, absent probable cause to arrest under the
fourth amendment, has never been squarely decided.
In examining the fourth amendment ramifications of such an order, the
viewing of the suspect by witnesses must be distinguished from the detention
necessary to permit the viewing. 12 The viewing itself should not violate a
suspect's fourth amendment rights because the right to privacy guaranteed by
the fourth amendment extends only to the individual's "expectation of pri-
vacy."' 13 Since the viewing of one's outward appearance may hardly be said to
7. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. See notes 63-67 infra and accompanying text.
9. See Part II infra.
10. See Part III infra.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (compelling defendant to
appear in lineup does not violate fifth amendment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265.67
(1967) (taking of handwriting exemplars does not violate defendant's fifth amendment rights);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking of blood samples does not violate
defendant's constitutional rights); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-S3 (1910) (compelling
defendant to put on perpetrator's blouse does not violate fifth amendment).
12. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); United States v. Doe, 4S7 F 2d 895.
898-99 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 941 (1973).
13. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (tapping a public telephone violates
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infringe on one's expectation of privacy, no fourth amendment problem
should arise. 
14
Consistent with this analysis, courts have generally found no fourth
amendment violation where a suspect incarcerated on another charge is
ordered into a lineup for a crime for which there is no probable cause to arrest
him, because the procedure requires no detention without probable cause. 15
However, the incarcerated suspect still retains some rights under the fourth
amendment.16 Thus, some courts have intimated that even when the suspect
is incarcerated, he may not be compelled to appear in a lineup absent
reasonable suspicion 17 that he committed the crime under investigation.1
one's expectation of privacy and thus one's fourth amendment rights); In re Multi-Vehicle
Accident, 135 N.J. Super. 190, 193, 342 A.2d 903, 905 (L. Div. 1975) (no expectation of privacy
as to facial features).
14. Cf. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (no expectation of privacy as to
handwriting exemplars); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (no expectation of
privacy as to voice exemplars); United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 941 (1973) (no expectation of privacy as to handwriting exemplars).
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972) (person arrested and arraigned
placed in lineup); United States v. Perry, 504 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (person arrested and
arraigned on unrelated charge properly placed in lineup); United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (defendant held on unrelated crime placed in lineup for crimes of
similar modus operandi); United States v. Evans, 359 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1966) (incarcerated
defendant compelled to appear in lineup on unrelated charge); Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710
(3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966) (prisoners awaiting trial properly placed in lineup
for other offenses); United States v. Anderson, 352 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d
785 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (defendant lawfully in custody may be placed in lineup for similar but
unrelated offense); Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (incarcerated defendant
compelled to appear in lineup on unrelated charge); State v. Fierro, 107 Ariz. 479, 489 P.2d
713 (1971) (defendant may be placed in lineup while in jail for an unrelated crime); People v.
Hodge, 526 P.2d 309, 310 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (defendant properly detained on one charge
properly placed in lineup on another charge); People v. Nelson, 40 I1. 2d 146, 238 N.E.2d
378 (1968) (defendant incarcerated on another charge may be placed in lineup); People v.
Hall, 24 Mich. App. 509, 180 N.W.2d 363 (1970), leave to appeal granted, 391 Mich. 786
(1974) (incarcerated suspect may be placed in lineup for unrelated crime without a warrant).
But see Mackell v. Palermo, 59 Misc. 2d 760, 300 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (held fact
that defendant was incarcerated did not empower court to order him into a lineup in an-
other county).
16. See, e.g., People v. Vega, 51 App. Div. 2d 33, 379 N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1976)
(prisoner cannot be ordered to change his appearance absent probable cause to arrest).
17. "Reasonable suspicion" has been defined as "the quantum of knowledge sufficient to
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe criminal
activity is at hand." People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112-13, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365
N.Y.S.2d 509, 516 (1975); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Rigney v.
Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966) (defendant ordered to
appear in lineup only for crimes of similar modus operandi); Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp.
498, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (inmate ordered to appear in lineup only where police have "reason to
believe that an inmate may have been involved in the commission of a major crime under
investigation'); State v. Fierro, 107 Ariz. 479, 489 P.2d 713 (1971) (defendant ordered to appear
in lineup only for similar crimes).
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When the suspect is at liberty, the controversial issue raised is whether the
suspect may be detained for purposes of a lineup absent probable cause to
arrest. If the individual is under indictment, and has been released on bail or
parole, he is generally subject to the control of the court which is empowered
to order his appearance.1 9 Some courts have held that this power may be
exercised to order defendant's appearance in a lineup for an unrelated crime
without violating the fourth amendment. 20 As in the case of incarcerated
suspects, courts have intimated that such power may be exercised only where
there is reason to suspect that the defendant committed the unrelated crime
under investigation. 21
Where the suspect is at liberty and not subject to the control of the court, a
serious constitutional question arises as to whether the suspect may be
detained for purposes of a lineup, with or without a court order. So-called
"investigatory detentions" conducted without probable cause to arrest have
been held valid, even where conducted without authorization by a court. For
instance, in Terry v. Ohio,22 the Supreme Court upheld a police officer's right
to stop an individual whom he reasonably suspected of criminal activity and
to frisk that individual for weapons. 23 Other cases have upheld more exten-
sive warrantless intrusions based on reasonable suspicion. 24
Significantly, the fact that no reasonable grounds for suspicion were presented to the court has
been cited as the controlling factor in Mackell v. Palermo, 59 Misc. 2d 760, 300 N.Y.S.2d 459
(Sup. Ct. 1969), where a New York trial court refused to order an incarcerated individual to
shave and appear in a lineup. See In re Homicide of Aucelli, 174 N.Y.L.J. at 15, cols. 4-5 (Sup.
CL July 2, 1975) and Merola v. Fico, 81 Misc. 2d 206, 365 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. CL 1975), which
held that lineup orders were valid where reasonable grounds for suspicion were alleged.
19. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L. § 530.60 (McKinney 1971) (court may order defendant's appear-
ance to review his bail).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 352 F. Supp. 33, 36 n.7 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd 490
F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (once defendant has been arrested he may be ordered to appear in
lineup for unrelated crime even if on bail); Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498, 501 (E.D. Pa.
1965) (persons free on bail for unrelated crimes may be required to submit to possible identifica-
tion by victim in crime for which he is not formally charged); People v. Mineo, 85 Misc. 2d 919,
381 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (defendant arrested may be fingerprinted to see if sought for
other offenses); cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972); United States v. Scarpellino,
431 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1970); Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969). See also Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, 743 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
21. See, e.g., Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (defendant
ordered to appear in lineup for crimes of similar modus operandi); cf. cases cited in note 18 supra.
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
23. Id. at 21-22, 24.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Mayes, 524 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975) (warrantless
detention during police investigation); United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975) (detention for questioning); United States v, Scheiblauer,
472 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1973) (brief detention for questioning); Early v. People, 178 Colo.
167, 173, 496 P.2d 1021, 1025 (1972) (en banc) (warrantless detention for palmprinting reason-
able); People v. Morales, - App. Div. 2d - , -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (1st Dep't
1976) (Birns, J., concurring) (limited detention for purposes of questioning not unreasonable), In
re Carlos B., 86 Misc. 2d 160, 163-64, 382 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658-59 (Fan. Ct. 1976) (detention for
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However, in Davis v. Mississippi,2 5 where police detained and finger-
printed defendant without probable cause to arrest, the Supreme Court held
that defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated.2 6 In so doing, the
Court suggested that the police should have obtained a warrant from a
judicial officer. 27
Following the mandate of Davis v. Mississippi, a suspect should be
detained pursuant to the authorization of a judicial officer. 28 However, the
Court in Davis did not reach the question of whether a court may issue such a
warrant without probable cause to order the suspect's arrest.2 9 Moreover, the
problem presented in Davis is distinguishable from that examined here. Davis
involved a detention for the purpose of securing defendant's fingerprints,
while the issue here involves a detention for the purpose of securing an
eyewitness identification. Some authorities have noted that since eyewitness
identifications are a less reliable form of evidence than fingerprints, the fourth
amendment requirements of detentions for the purposes of lineups should be
far more stringent. In other words, the court should require more evidence
against the suspect to order him into a lineup than it would to order him to be
fingerprinted. 30 Other authorities have suggested a more logical alternative: to
ensure the absence of suggestiveness at a lineup held without probable cause
purpose of showup reasonable); People v. Pitts, 174 N.Y.L.J. at 10, cols. 2-4 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 22,
1975) (detention to determine ownership of machines in defendants' possession reasonable); People
v. Beatrice, 174 N.Y.L.J. at 11, cols. 5-6 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1975) (detention to ascertain
ownership of watches in defendant's possession reasonable); State v. Byers, 85 Wash. 2d 783, 539
P.2d 833 (1975) (en banc) (transporting suspect to scene of crime was a permissible detention). But
see People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384, 540 P.2d 632, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975) (transporting
suspect to scene of crime was an impermissible detention).
25. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
26. Id. at 728.
27. Id., where the Court noted "the general requirement [in cases of searches and sei-
zures] that the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention would seem
not to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
which condoned a "stop and frisk" without a warrant, is distinguishable from Davis v.
Mississippi in that Terry deals with the police officer's right to ensure his safety in street
situations. Terry permitted "a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual
." 392 U.S. at 27.
28. See United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317, 1323 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
927 (1973) (handwriting exemplars wrongfully obtained without a warrant may be suppressed);
United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 196 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting warrant procedure
for ordering individuals to appear in lineups absent probable cause to arrest).
29. 394 U.S. at 728.
30. See In re Investigation of a Multi-Vehicle Accident, 135 N.J. Super. 190, 195-96, 342
A.2d 903, 906 (L. Div. 1975) (denying state's request for an order compelling defendant to allow
himself to be photographed for purposes of photographic lineup because eyewitness identification
is a less reliable mode of investigation than fingerprinting); Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara
and See, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1011, 1041 (1973); Note, Detention to Obtain Physical Evidence
Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 72
Colum. L. Rev. 712, 741-44 (1972).
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to arrest, the suspect should have counsel present. 31 Though the United States
Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel attaches only when
defendant is indicted or otherwise formally charged, 32 these authorities indi-
cate that the presence of counsel at a lineup held without probable cause to
arrest is a factor lending to the reasonableness of the detention under the
fourth amendment. 33
In any event, court-ordered detentions of suspects for the purpose of
obtaining physical evidence have been upheld where there was only reason-
able suspicion that the suspect committed the crime. 34 Moreover, the sug-
gested procedure outlined in Davis has been applied to detentions for the
purpose of lineups. 35 Such detentions have been authorized on reasonable
suspicion rather than upon probable cause to believe the individual commit-
ted the crime. 36 In accord with this line of cases, 37 the ALI Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure delineates a procedure whereby a court may order
the detention of an individual for "identification purposes138 where there is
31. See United States v. Thomas, 536 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1289 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (per curiam); United States v. Eley, 286 A.2d 239, 240-41 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), Wise
v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Idaho Code § 19-625(2)(H) (Supp. 1975);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-278(5) (1973); cf. United States v. McNeese, 361 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Okla. 1973) (obtaining handwriting exemplars prior to defendant's arrest complies with fourth
amendment since defendant waived right to counsel).
32. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), where the Court held that a showup conducted
before defendant was indicted or otherwise formally charged was not a "criminal prosecution" at
which defendant had a constitutional right to be represented by counsel.
33. See generally authorities cited in note 31 supra.
34. See In re Fingerprinting of M.B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 123-24, 309 A.2d 3, 7 (App. Div.
1973) (order that suspect be fingerprinted); District Atty. v. Angelo G., 48 App. Div. 2d 576, 580,
371 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131 (2d Dep't 1975); Note, Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1,
56 Minn. L. Rev. 667 (1972); cases cited in note 35 infra.
35. See United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 196 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970); WVise v. Murphy,
275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Merola v. Fico, 81 Misc. 2d 206, 365 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct.
1975); In re Homicide of Aucelli, 174 N.Y.L.J. at 15, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. July 2, 1975).
36. See Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), noted in 18 Wayne L. Rev. 827
(1972); Merola v. Fico, 81 Misc. 2d 206, 365 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1975); In re Homicide of
Aucelli, 174 N.Y.L.J. at 15, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. July 2, 1975); Comment, Detention for Taking
Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause, 14 Ariz. L. Rev. 132, 13940 (1972); cf. Biehunik v.
Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) (detention for purposes of
lineup valid without probable cause if "reasonableness" test satisfied).
37. See ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 462-75 (1975) (commentary) [here-
inafter cited as Code], noted in Vorenberg, ALI Approves Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, 61 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1975).
38. Code, supra note 37, §§ 170. 1-.8. Identification procedures covered by the Code include
body surface examinations such as fingerprinting, id. § 170.1(2)(a), and "procedures to obtain
witness identification through lineups, photographs, voice samples or handwriting exemplars."
Id. § 170.1(2)(d). The Code further provides for "procedures to obtain specimens or samples of
blood, urine, saliva, hair or fingernails, or other bodily substances that can be obtained by
comparable methods. . . procedures to obtain identification material that may be on the surface
of the body or under fingernails or that can be obtained by comparable methods ... " Id. §
170. 1(2)(b)-(c).
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probable cause to believe a crime was committed and reasonable suspicion
that the individual committed the crime.39 An order will be issued only where
the results of the procedure will be of "material aid in determining whether
the person named in the affidavit committed the offense, ' '40 and where such
evidence is not readily obtainable from another public agency.
4 1
Several states have passed similar legislation. 4 2 Such statutes fall into two
categories. Some jurisdictions require that there be probable cause to believe a
crime was committed and reason to suspect that the individual named in the
order committed the offense before an order may issue.4 3 Others merely
require probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and that
procurement of such evidence "from an identified or particularly described
individual may contribute to the identification of the individual who commit-
ted such offense."'44 Arizona's statute requires less than reasonable suspicion
that the subject of the order committed the crime under investigation, yet that
state has found no constitutional infirmity.45 In State v. Grijalva,46 the
Supreme Court of Arizona noted that the Arizona statute permitted a limited
detention, not to exceed three hours, 47 only on a clear showing of necessity by
the state. In making such a showing the state must establish that the evidence
sought is relevant to the investigation and not otherwise obtainable, 48 and
that the offense in question constitutes a felony.49 Balancing the rights of the
defendant with the interests of society, the court held that the "reasonable-
ness" requirement of the fourth amendment was satisfied.5 0
39. Id. § 170.2(6)(a)-(b).
40. Id. § 170.2(6)(c).
41. Id. § 170.2(6)(d). The purpose of this section is to limit the number of nontestimonial
identification orders. If a suspect can show that the evidence is otherwise available to the law
enforcement agency, he can move to vacate the order. Id. at 105 (commentary).
42. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1424 (Supp. 1973); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Rules of
Criminal Procedure 41.1 (1973); Idaho Code § 19-625 (Supp. 1975); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3301-07
(Supp. 1974); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-271-82 (1973); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-37 (Supp. 1975).
43. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Rules of Criminal Procedure 41.1(c) (1973); Idaho Code §
19-625(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-273(1)-(2) (1973); Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-37(1) (Supp. 1975). Also of this genre is Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.1, 52 F.R.D. 462
(1971). For an examination of the North Carolina statute, see Billings, Pretrial Criminal
Procedure Act: Scope and Objectives, 10 Wake Forest L. Rev. 353 (1974).
44. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1424(A)(2) (Supp. 1973); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3303(2) (Supp.
1974). A bill providing for a similar procedure on the federal level was introduced in the Senate In
1969 but apparently died in committee. S. 2997, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
45. See State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533 (1975) (en banc) (detention to obtain
photographs, fingerprints, and hair samples of defendant); Long v. Garrett, 22 Ariz. App. 397,
527 P.2d 1240 (2d Div. 1974) (detention to obtain handwriting exemplar).
46. 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533 (1975) (en banc).
47. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1424(B)(7) (Supp. 1973).
48. Id. § 13-1424(A)(2)-(3).
49. Id. § 13-1424(A)(1) (offense punishable by at least one year).
50. 111 Ariz. 476, 479, 533 P.2d 533, 536 (1975) (en banc) where the Court noted: "Itihe
concept of reasonableness requires a balancing between the public necessity and the extent to
which an individual's interest in privacy is inVaded."
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Though the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and
seizures, it also specifies that warrants shall not issue except upon probable
cause. However, Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the existence of
probable cause depends on whether the search and seizure is reasonable."s In
Camara v. Municipal Court,52 the Supreme Court defined probable cause as
"the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the
constitutional mandate of reasonableness.1 s3 To apply the standard, the
Court stated, one must balance the government's interest wvith the extent of
the intrusion upon the individual's rights. The lesser the intrusion, the less
evidence is required to establish probable cause. S4 Since an investigatory
detention should involve significantly less of an intrusion than a full-blown
arrest, ss the evidence required to connect the suspect with the crime should be
less than that necessary to establish probable cause to arrest
S6
51. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
52. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
53. Id. at 534.
54. Id. at 538-39.
55. See cases cited in note 56 infra. But see United States v. Jennings, 468 F. 2d 111, 115 (9th
Cir. 1972) (investigatory detention for purpose of fingerprinting must meet probable cause
standards substantially similar to those for an arrest); Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara
and See, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1011, 1041-42 (1973).
56. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. CL 3074, 3081 (1976) (border search); United
States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317, 1323 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973)
(handwriting exemplar); Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932
(1971) (lineup); United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (lineup); Early v.
People, 178 Colo. 167, 172, 496 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1972) (en banc) (fingerprinting); Wise v.
Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 212-17 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (en banc) (lineup), noted in 18 Wayne L.
Rev. 827 (1972); In re Investigation of a Multi-Vehicle Accident, 135 N.J. Super. 190, 196-97, 342
A.2d 903, 906-07 (L. Div. 1975) (photographing suspect); In re Fingerprinting of M.B., 125 N.J.
Super. 115, 123-24, 309 A.2d 3, 7 (App. Div. 1973); People v. DeBour, No. 212 at 4 (N.Y. Ct.
App. June 15, 1976) (frisk); People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1968), vacated and remanded, 396 U.S. 102 (1969) (per curiam) (detention for questioning); District
Atty. v. Angelo G., 48 App. Div. 2d 576, 579, 371 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131-32 (2d Dep't 1975)
(handwriting exemplar); Merola v. Fico, 81 Misc. 2d 206, 208, 365 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (lineup); Note, Detention To Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed
Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 712, 741-44 (1972);
Note, Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 667, 676 (1972), cf.
Burke v. Sullivan, 52 App. Div. 2d 536, 382 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1976) (court did not exceed
authority by ordering defendant to appear in lineup since probable cause for order existed),
People v. Vega, 51 App. Div. 2d 33, 379 N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1976) (defendant may only be
required to change his appearance for purposes of a lineup after his arrest). Significantly, in
People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 238 N.E.2d 307, 312, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 905 (1968), the
New York Court of Appeals held that the legality of a detention for purposes of questioning must
be determined by "weighing the seriousness of the known crime . .. and the degree of suspicion
possessed by the police against the magnitude of the personal rights encroached upon." They
concluded the detention was valid since police had reason to suspect the defendant had
information about the crime when they detained him for questioning. The Supreme Court of the
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These principles have been specifically applied in upholding lineups con-
ducted without probable cause to arrest.5 7 Statutes providing for orders
compelling a suspect to appear in a lineup on evidence establishing reasonable
suspicion that he committed the offense in question5 8 or evidence establishing
that so compelling the individual will aid in the investigation59 follow this line
of reasoning. 60 Thus, while the trend is toward variable standards of probable
cause, the law is still unclear as to whether an investigatory detention on less
than probable cause to arrest satisfies such standards. 6 1
III. DEFENDANT'S REMEDIES
If a suspect is unconstitutionally detained and is subsequently identified in a
lineup, testimony that such an identification was made should not be admitted
at trial. 62 However, the same witness who may not testify that he identified
defendant at the lineup may still be permitted to identify defendant in open
court at trial. Except in cases where defendant's fourth amendment rights
were willfully and egregiously violated, 63 the witness' in-court identification is
United States, rather than grapple with the issue of the constitutionality of an investigatory
detention, remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the police had
probable cause to arrest when they detained defendant. Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102,
105-06 (1969) (per curiam). On remand, the appellate division affirmed the hearing judge's finding
that the police did have probable cause to arrest. People v. Morales, - App, Div. 2d -, 383
N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 1976). Judge Lupiano concurred, concluding that although the police
lacked probable cause to arrest, their conduct was reasonable. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at
609-10. Judge Birns concurred, in effect reiterating the principles set forth in the earlier Court of
Appeals decision. Id. at-, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11. Judge Murphy dissented, concluding that
detentions on less than probable cause to arrest were illegal under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975). Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 614. See note 61 infra.
57. See, e.g., Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 230-31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
932 (1971); Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 212-17 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Merola v. Fico, 81
Misc. 2d 206, 365 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
58. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Code, supra note 37, at 459-69.
61. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) reaffirmed the principles of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which held that an admission obtained from defendant after his
illegal arrest without probable cause could not be used against him. Evidence which came to light
from defendant's statements was also inadmissible unless such evidence came to light" 'by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " 371 U.S. at 488, citing J. Maguire,
Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the Court held that the
fact that police gave defendant his Miranda warnings after illegally arresting him without
probable cause did not purge his confession of the taint of the illegal arrest. This decision may be
interpreted as holding that evidence derived from detentions upon less than probable cause to
arrest must be suppressed. People v. Morales, - App. Div. 2d at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (1st
Dep't 1976) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
62. See United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see United States v.
Young, 512 F.2d 321, 323 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1432 (1976) (illegality of arrest
would not render pretrial identification inadmissible).
63. See United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1970), noted in 12 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 921 (1971), where defendants were arrested on mere pretext and placed in a lineup. The
admissible if it is of "independent origin." 64 This remedy is derived from
United States v. Wade, 65 where defendant was identified at a lineup held in
violation of his constitutional rights.,6 The Court noted that the witness could
still make an identification at trial where the government established "by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon
observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification," 67 i.e., that
the in-court identification was based upon an "independent source."
The remedy suggested in Wade is not complete. If a suspect is illegally
compelled to participate in a lineup, he is still subject to criminal prosecution
and the witness' damning in-court identification. Therefore, defendant's best
course would be to prevent execution of the lineup order, foreclosing the
possibility of being identified as the perpetrator. There are some difficulties in
obtaining such relief. 68
A. Relief Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A possible course available to an individual compelled to appear in a lineup
by state authorities is commencement of an action in federal court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983,69 charging violation of his fourth amendment rights under
court excluded in-court identification from the trial testimony despite its independent source.
Compare id. with People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662, 339 N.E.2d 162, 376 N.Y S.2d 469 (1975)
(police arrested defendant in good faith but in violation of fourth amendment, and defendant later
confessed to unrelated crime; confession was admissible).
64. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972); United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d
501 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968); Wright v. State, 528 S.W 2d 905, 909
(Ark. 1975); State v. Smith, 322 So. 2d 197, 203 (La. 1975); State v Lynch. 528 SW.2d 454,
459-60 (Mo. CL App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Richards, 327 A.2d 63, 68-69 (Pa. 1974). But see
United States v. Young, 512 F.2d 321, 323 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1432 (1976)
(admissibility of identification testimony depends on suggestiveness of initial confrontation).
65. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
66. Id. at 233-37. In this case the constitutional right violated was defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel.
67. Id. at 240.
68. For the difficulties in obtaining review of such orders issued by a federal court, see Note,
Detention to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41 1 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 712, 734-41 (1972). which concludes
that successfully obtaining interlocutory review is improbable since the final decision rule applies
to criminal cases. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). However, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals has determined that such orders are final, consistent with the view
of finality taken in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 54547 t0949). See
United States v. Eley, 286 A.2d 239, 240 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); Wise v. Murphy, 275 A. 2d 205,
211 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (en banc). Relief by extraordinary writ may be foreclosed since
defendant has alternative, albeit inadequate, remedies of pretrial motions to suppress and
post-conviction appeal. See United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per
curiam).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
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color of state law. The individual would seek an injunction barring state
officials from requiring him to appear in a lineup. This route, however, is
fraught with problems.
If the suspect is compelled to appear without judicial authorization, injunc-
tive relief is impractical,7 0 since such warrantless detentions may occur
without notice. If judicial authorization is obtained, there may be legal
obstacles to injunctive relief. Though a state judgevl is immune from a
judgment for damages, 72 his judicial immunity does not extend to injunctive
relief.73
However, the Supreme Court has looked upon injunctions against state
criminal proceedings with disfavor. In Younger v. Harris,74 the Court stated
that federal courts would not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions
unless the prosecution was conducted in bad faith and confronted petitioner
with irreparable harm, both great and immediate. 75 In a companion case,
Dyson v. Stein,76 the Supreme Court held that the principles of Younger were
applicable to prospective criminal prosecutions. 77 More recently, however, in
redress." Such relief may be sought without exhausting state remedies. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183 (1961).
70. Injunctive relief may be legally feasible, however. See, eg., Biehunik v. Fellcetta, 441
F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966); Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(injunctions against officials holding lineups denied on merits); cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975); Note, Federal Equitable Relief in Matters Collateral to State Criminal Proceedings, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 597 (1975).
71. A state court is not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and therefore cannot be made
a party defendant. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div.,
Second Dep't, 421 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970); Harris v. Louisiana Supreme Court, 334 F. Supp.
1289, 1300 (E.D. La. 1971). However, the members of the court may be sued individually. E.g.,
Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
72. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335 (1871) (judge not civilly liable except where he clearly lacks jurisdiction and knows It).
73. See, e.g., Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127,
130 (7th Cir. 1971); Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1166 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Louisiana ex. rel.
Purkey v. Ciolino, 393 F. Supp. 102, 110 (E.D. La. 1975); Wallace v. McDonald, 369 F. Supp.
180, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311, 1321-22 (M.D. Fla. 1969);
United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720, 728 (S.D. Ala. 1965). But see Hill v. McClellan, 490
F.2d 859, 868 (5th Cir. 1974); Atchley v. Greenhill, 373 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (S.D. Tex. 1974),
aff'd, 517 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1115 (1976). Enjoining a state
proceeding does not violate the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
74. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
75. Id. at 45-46, 53.
76. 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam).
77. Plaintiff sought an injunction against future arrests and seizure of allegedly obscene
material without an adversary hearing. The district court denied this relief, but granted
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the state statute based on its unconstitu-
tionality. Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969). The Supreme Court emphasized
Gerstein v. Pugh,78 the Court enjoined state procedures whereby persons
already arrested were detained without a hearing to determine whether there
was probable cause to arrest. The Court indicated that the restrictions of
Younger did not apply because "[tlhe injunction was not directed at the state
prosecutions as such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a
judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. '79 However, the absence of judicial intervention in the state
procedures challenged in Gerstein distinguishes that case from the situation
where a court orders an individual to appear in a lineup.
If no injunctive relief is available, the individual whose rights have been
violated will be subject to criminal prosecution and in-court identification. If
he seeks to ease the discomfort of his predicament with monetary damages,
judicial immunity will foreclose his recovery from judges or prosecutors.8 0
However, as the Court recently noted in Imbler v. Pachtman,8 ' a prosecutor
engaged in investigatory activities might not be entitled to the absolute
immunity that he shares with judges when he acts in his quasi-judicial
capacity. When he acts as an investigator he may be entitled only to a good
faith defense similar to the policeman's.82 Generally, where a prosecutor
engages in searches or seizures, he is acting in his investigatory capacity,8 3
and thus only the defense of good faith, i.e., that he believed the seizure was
constitutional, would be available.8 4 However, if these officials were merely
executing the warrant of a judicial officer according to his instructions, they
would not be liable for damages.85 Consequently, recovery of damages under
section 1983 may be limited to cases of warrantless detentions conducted in
bad faith. 86
that the sole ground for enjoining pending state court criminal proceedings was a finding of
irreparable injury. 401 U.S. at 203.
In addition, federal courts cannot suppress illegally seized evidence while the state criminal
proceeding is still pending if the conditions set forth in Younger are not met. Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).
78. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
79. Id. at 108 n.9.
80. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976) (prosecutor immune); Guedry v.
Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970) (judge and prosecutor immune); Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1967) (justice of the peace and prosecutor immune).
81. 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
82. Id. at 995.
83. See, e.g., Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974) (obtaining wiretap order);
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)
(warrantless search and seizure); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) (detention to
obtain confession).
84. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557
(1967) (police may rely only on good faith defense).
85. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Feiling v. Sincavage, 439 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir- 1971) (per
curiam).
86. E.g., Beightol v. Kunowski, 486 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff stated a valid claim for
damages against police who arrested him for purposes of fingerprinting and photographing him
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B. Remedies in New York
The New York Court of Appeals held in Alphonso C. v. Morgenthau87 that
a judge's order compelling an individual to appear in a lineup was not subject
to interlocutory appeal. Applying the rule set forth in Santangello v. People8
that all appeals in criminal proceedings must be specifically authorized by
statute, the court held that orders compelling suspects to appear in lineups
were in the nature of criminal proceedings.8 9
Where there is no remedy by appeal, New York provides for equitable
relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition pursuant to Article 78 of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 90 Such relief is only available in
limited circumstances, and is granted sparingly in criminal matters, 9 1
Petitioner must show that the issuing judge exceeded his jurisdiction and that
petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief 92 sought before his petition may
be adjudicated on the merits. 93 In essence, petitioner may successfully chal-
lenge the order directing his detention only if he shows that the court lacked
jurisdiction to so order. The Appellate Division, First Department held in
Alphonso C. v. Morgenthau94 that a supreme court judge lacked jurisdiction
to order Alphonso C. to appear in a lineup absent probable cause to arrest.
But its determination was contrary to the second department's decision in
District Attorney v. Angelo G., 95 which held that a supreme court judge had
authority to order the detention of a suspect for investigatory purposes where
there was sufficient evidence linking the suspect to the crime so as to render
the detention reasonable. 96 In other words, Angelo G. applied the variable
87. 38 N.Y.2d 923, 346 N.E.2d 819, 382 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1976) (per curiam).
88. 38 N.Y.2d 536, 344 N.E.2d 404, 381 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1976).
89. 38 N.Y.2d at 924-25, 346 N.E.2d at 819, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 981. In Santangello v. People,
38 N.Y.2d 536, 344 N.E.2d 404, 381 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1976), the Court of Appeals noted that
decisions on motions to quash subpoenas for lack of jurisdiction are appealable even though such
appeals are not authorized by statute. This route could have been utilized in Alphonso C., since
the order compelling the suspect to appear in a lineup was very similar to a subpoena.
90. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
91. See, e.g., State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 324 N.E.2d 351, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1975); Butts
v. Justices of the Court of Spec. Sess., 37 App. Div. 2d 607, 323 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (2d Dep't
1971) (courts are reluctant "to award such relief, unless a clear case of arbitrary and illegal action,
without reasonable explanation or excuse, is presented").
92. See, e.g., State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 62, 324 N.E.2d 351, 353-54, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879,
882 (1975); Proskin v. County Court, 30 N.Y.2d 15, 280 N.E.2d 875, 330 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1972);
Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 267 N.E.2d 452, 454, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 708-09,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971); Smith v. Conway, 44 App. Div. 2d 622, 353 N.Y.S.2d 75 (3d
Dep't 1974); Butts v. Justices of the Court of Spec. Sess., 37 App. Div. 2d 607, 323 N.Y.S.2d 619
(2d Dep't 1971).
93. If there is no such showing, respondent may move to dismiss the petition for objections in
point of law pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804() (McKinney 1963).
94. 50 App. Div. 2d 97, 376 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st Dep't 1975), appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.2d
923, 346 N.E.2d 819, 382 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1976) (per curiam).
95. 48 App. Div. 2d 576, 371 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dep't 1975), appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.2d
923, 346 N.E.2d 819, 382 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1976) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 579, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
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standard of probable cause, suggested in Camara v. Municipal Court,97 in
determining that a supreme court judge, without probable cause to arrest,
could order a suspect to give handwriting exemplars. The first department,
however, has since clarified its position as set forth in Alphonso C. In an
Article 78 proceeding challenging an order based on less than probable cause
to arrest which directed a suspect to appear in a lineup, the first department
dismissed the petition, noting that "[p]robable cause for the order to appear in
a lineup has been demonstrated, thus distinguishing this case from Matter of
Alphonso C..... ."98 Consequently, the first department apparently also
recognizes variable standards of probable cause, and will entertain an Article
78 proceeding only where petitioner is ordered detained on evidence in-
sufficient to meet these standards, i.e., evidence so insufficient as to render
the detention unreasonable.
The current consensus of New York courts is apparently that a suspect may
be ordered detained for investigatory purposes absent probable cause to
arrest. However, the People must establish probable cause for the detention,
i.e., sufficient evidence linking the suspect with the crime to render the
detention reasonable. Once the issuing judge determines that there is probable
cause to order the detention, Article 78 relief will be foreclosed since it is not
available to reverse errors of law or fact.9 9
C. Possible Alternzatives
In Wise v. Murphy, 00 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
orders compelling an individual to appear in a lineup were directly appealable
in that jurisdiction.10 1 Following this example, the ALI Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure' 0 2 suggests legislative enactment of a procedure
which includes a provision whereby the individual named in the order may
move to vacate said order "if [the court] finds that there were insufficient
grounds for issuance or that the order was otherwise improperly issued.'10 3
As noted in the commentary thereto, those states adopting nontestimonial
identification procedures have not adopted the Code provisions providing for
direct appeal.10 4 However, the availability of such review may have practical
disadvantages, e.g., delay. This could only increase the possibility of misiden-
tification, and be an added burden on the courts.' 05
97. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
98. Burke v. Sullivan, 52 App. Div. 2d 536, 382 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1976)-
99. See State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 62, 324 N.E.2d 351, 353, 364 N Y S 2d 879, 882
(1975).
100. 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (en banc).
101. Id. at 211; accord, In re Investigation of a Multi-Vehicle Accident, 135 NJ. Super.
190, 342 A.2d 903 (L. Div. 1975); In re Fingerprinting of M.B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3
(App. Div. 1973).
102. See Code, note 37 supra.
103. Id. § 170.6.
104. Id. at 487-88.
105. Id.; see Note, Detention to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cauw. Proposed




Though there has been no clear determination as to the constitutionality of
compelling a suspect to appear in a lineup absent probable cause to arrest, the
apparent consensus of the courts is that such detentions are permissible where
there is sufficient evidence linking the suspect to the crime so as to render the
seizure reasonable, i.e., probable cause for the detention. Where a suspect is
nonetheless ordered to appear in a lineup without probable cause, his most
effective remedy may be pursued only after he is identified, by a motion to
suppress the identification. However, the witness' in-court identification of the
suspect will not be suppressed where it is based upon an "independent
source." In view of the difficulties encountered by the subject of a lineup
order in securing relief, the legislative enactment of safeguards ensuring the
individual the right to have an attorney present during the lineup, 10 6 limiting
the length of the detention, 10 7 and prohibiting certain police conduct such as
questioning the suspect during that period'0 8 are in order.
Barbara D. Gonzo
106. See Idaho Code § 19-625(2)(H) (Supp. 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-278(5) (1975); Code,
note 37 supra, § 170.3(2)(m); note 31 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1424(B)(7) (Supp. 1973); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Rules of
Criminal Procedure 41.I(f)(1) (1973); Idaho Code § 19-625(2)(G) (Supp. 1975); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
29-3305(9) (Supp. 1974); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-279(c) (1975); Code, note 37 supra, § 170.3(2)(I).
108. See Idaho Code § 19-625(2)(1) (Supp. 1975); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3305(6) (Supp. 1974);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-278(6) (1975); Code, note 37 supra, § 170.3(2)0).
